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BOOK REVIEW
Inside the Canadian Judicial System: Judges and Judging by Pe-
ter McCormick and Ian Greene. Toronto: James Lorimer &
Company, 1990. Pp. XII, 467. Index.
.C. De Coste*
Judging is the process of determining specific pieces of social history
and of translating that history into propositions of law. In this, law's
alchemy, a description of events in a world now past becomes transmuted
to statements about right and obligation, about guilt and innocence;
statements which bind the future. In the 1920s and 1930s, an upstart
American realism raised a question-a simple, yet unnerving question-
which challenged law's magic. To what degree, the realists inquired,
does the social history of the judge, her sociology, determine the descrip-
tion of facts and their subsequent translation to law? This question has
been at the heart of all mature theoretical discourse ever since. Theorists
have argued that the relationship between law and life is either much
more coherent and defensible than the realists suggested1 or much more
contradictory and ideological than they had ever imagined.2
Until quite recently, Canada's legal academy has been largely unaf-
fected by post-realist discourse.3 Secure in a peculiarly long-lived accept-
* Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Alberta.
1 Hart and Dworkin are, of course, central to this strand of post-realist jurisprudence. See
generally, R. Dworkin, LAw's EMPIRE (1986). See also H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
The post-realist defense of law's political and moral integrity has perhaps reached its final expression
in Dworkin's Empire.
2 Here are located contemporary critical scholars and, especially, Unger. See generally M.
KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987); R. UNGER, Social Theory: Its Situation
and Its Task in POLmcs: A WORK IN CONSTRUCTIVE SOCIAL THEORY (1987). Incidentally, Un-
ger's work, in my view, stands alone among critical scholars because it transcends the narrow agenda
of Euro-American legal thought (particularly its enduring obsession with formalism) and contributes
to the larger discourse of political and social theory. See also Rorty, Unger, Castoriadis, and the
Romance ofa National Future, 82 Nw. U.L. REv. 335, 351 (1988) (arguing that Unger's work "has
a better chance than most to be linked in the history books, with some.. .world-transforming
event.").
3 There have been some notable exceptions. See, e.g., P. WEILER, IN THE LASr RESORT: A
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ance of positivism's formalist and conceptualist story about law,
Canadian legal academics continued-and yet continue-to produce
scholarship modeled on an understanding of law and of scholarship now
past.4 However, this has not been the practice of other disciplines in the
Canadian academy. Canadian political scientists, in particular, quite
early joined the debate that realism engendered.' It is in this tradition
that McCormick and Green, both political scientists, proudly situate
themselves and their monograph.'
Two introductory chapters provide an all too simple version of the
role and history of the courts and a summary of federal and provincial
appointment practices. A concluding chapter offers the authors' recom-
mendations for judicial reform. The substance of the book consists of
seven chapters which report the authors' findings on the social back-
grounds of Canadian judges and on the perceptions held by Canadian
judges on judicial role and practice. The authors' report is based on data
collected from three sources: interviews with ninety-one judges from all
levels of court in Alberta and Ontario;7 interviews with an unspecified
CRITICAL STUDY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA (1974); J. WILLIS, THE PARLIAMENTARY
POWERS OF ENGLISH GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS (1933); Peck, A Behavioral Approach to the
Judicial Process Scalogram Analysis, 5 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 1 (1967); Peck The Supreme Court of
Canada, 1958-1966: A search for Policy Through Scalogram Analysis, 45 CAN. BAR REV. 666; Willis,
Statutory Interpretation in a Nutshell, 16 CAN. BAR REV. 1 (1938).
4 See, eg., Baker, The Reconstruction of Upper Canadian Legal Thought in the Late-Victorian
Empire, 1985 LAW & HsT. REv. 219; CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON RESEARCH AND EDUC., LAW
AND LEARNING (1983) (a report to the Social Science and Humanities Research Council)(see espe-
cially chapters 5, 6, 7 & 10). Blaine Baker points to the nature of Canadian legal academic produc-
tion as evidence of the "enigmatic and unparalleled longevity" of positivism in Canada:
One sign of this persistence is the recent production by Canadian legal academics of small
and modest treatise literature which, revealingly, is modelled closely after classical late-
nineteenth-century forms and is based largely on English decisional law.. .There has not
yet been a coherent functional, empirical, or ethical assault on the imported late-nine-
teenth-century Canadian version of legal conceptualism.
Baker, The Reconstruction of Upper Canadian Legal Thought in the Late-Victorian Empire, 1985
LAW & HIST. REV. 219, 276-77. See also Monahan, Judicial Review and Democracy: A Theory of
Judicial Review, 21 U.B.C.L. REv. 87, 88 (1987) (describing "[o]ne of the central components of
Canada's legal creed... [as] a belief in the continued viability of the distinction between the realms of
law and politics.").
5 See e.g., J. CORRY, DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS (1946); Statutory Powers, in
LEGAL ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ARTHUR MOXON 127 (J. Corry, F. Cronkite & E. Whitmore eds.
1953); J. CORRY, LAW AND POLITICS (1959).
6 P. MCCORMICK & I. GREENE, INSIDE THE CANADIAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM: JUDGES AND
JUDGING vii (1990).
7 Forty judges were interviewed in Ontario during 1979 and 1980 and fifty-one were inter-
viewed in Alberta in 1982 and 1983. The Ontario judicial interviews were supplemented by inter-
views of thirty-two trial lawyers, thirty crown counsel, and thirty-two court administrators. Id. at vi.
The Alberta judicial interviews were supplemented by interviews of forty-four trial lawyers, fifteen
court administrators, and nine crown counsel. Id.
It is worth noting, however, that many of the authors' findings were based on the Alberta
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number of retired Supreme Court of Canada justices; and basic biograph-
ical data collected on a sample of two hundred seventy-seven judges from
across Canada.' In this review, I will discuss both the authors' concep-
tion of their project and their report on the social histories and self-con-
ception of the Canadian judiciary. These two inquiries are interrelated,
and have much to do with the book's ultimate inadequacy.
At the beginning of the book, the authors disclose the premise, pur-
pose, and thesis of their project.9 The book's premise is that not all judi-
cial decision-making is adjudication, because when engaged in clarifying
ambiguous language in laws, courts are making policy.'0 The authors'
purpose is "to fill in some of the gaps in our understanding of how these
[policy] decisions... get made.. .[in order] to describe and demythologize
[judicial decision-making]" and thereby [this is their thesis] demonstrate
that judges "cannot help but be influenced by factors such as their social
backgrounds and the particular styles of decision-making they have un-
consciously adopted."" These proposals will strike anyone conversant
with legal theoretical discourse as both familiar and familiarly off the
mark. The thesis is clearly realist in nuance, as the authors "insist that,
beneath the robes, judges are people much like the rest of us."' 2 Clearly,
this is conceptually empty. Ronald Dworkin, for one, has taken much
effort to point out that, without more, nothing of theoretical interest fol-
lows from the fact that authoritative judgements of law are made by peo-
ple with moral and .political convictions. 3 Of course, he is correct
because otherwise all discourse, whether legal, aesthetic or philosophical,
automatically falls prey to an easy nihilism.
The American realists, however, were not nihilsts-they provided a
conceptual more. In one of its parts, realism proffered the principles of
social science as a cure for what would otherwise realistically amount to
law according to what the judge had for breakfast.' In its other, more
interviews only. Id. The book is the result of the amalgamation of two distinct projects (one being
Greene's doctoral dissertation) which were apparently undertaken for different purposes and funded
by different sources. This might also explain the book's considerable lack of focus (to whom, after
all, is it directed?) and structural integrity (Why are the civics lessons in the two introductory chap-
ters and the reforms proposed in the last chapter?). Since the authors' report of their research find-
ings is presumably the substance of the book, these matters will not be addressed again in this
review.
8 Id. Rather surprisingly, this data was collected exclusively from press releases announcing
appointments.
9 See P. McCoRMICK & I. GREENE, supra note 6, at iv-v.
10 Id. at iv, 78-80.
11 Id. atv.
12 Id. at 119. The authors announce their realism throughout: See, eg., Id. at iii, viii, 59, 138,
166, 244, 246.
13 See R. DwoRKmN, supra note 1. See also Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, in THE POLITIcs
OF INTERPRETATION 249 (W. Mitchell ed. 1982)[hereinafter Law as Interpretation].
14 For the social science strain of legal realism, see Cook, Scientific Method and the Law, 13
1991]
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radical aspect realism sought to demonstrate that legal reasoning was
necessarily of a deeply political and ideological character."5 In short, in
both its parts, American realism used its realist inquiry to bypass the
easy and self-satisfied conceptualism of classical legal thought so that
other projects and other proposals became possible. This is not true for
the present authors-their realism is a threadbare realism-a realism
without substance, and in consequence, without point. This poverty of
view is not, however, at all fortuitous. It is bred of their founding prem-
ise which, in turn, devolves from an exceedingly simple and inadequate
view of law and judicial practice. It is this view of law which leads the
authors to so under-appraise the significance of what they call policy,
especially as ideology, and to so under-evaluate the significance of their
data, particularly as evidence of the ideology of legal professionalism.
The authors believe the judicial work consists of two, essentially dif-
ferent, moments: a law-following moment and a policy-making moment.
In a fashion reminiscent of Herbert Hart, 6 they distinguish the two in
terms of the nature of legal language.1 7 When the language of law is
clear-especially when it consists of "specific directives rather than gen-
eral principles"I--judges follow the law19 because they are "applying
the law to... facts,"'2 and because at such moments the law consists of
"an objective set of standards."21 When the language of law is ambigu-
ous, however, and when judges are not, simply following the directions of
the law's language, instead of engaging in a process of clarifying its
meaning, they are making policy or legislating.22 This undefended and
indefensible version of law, and of judicial practice, informs the authors'
A.B.A.J. 303 (1927); Moore, Rational Basis of Legal Institutions, 23 COLUM. L. REv. 609 (1923);
Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A.J. 71 (1928). For recent commentary, see Schlegel,
American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: The Singular Case of Underhill Moore, 29
BuFF. L. REv. 195 (1980).
15 For the more radical strain of realist thought, see generally Cohen, The Ethical Basis of
Legal Criticism, 41 YALE L.J. 201 (1931); Cohen Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Ap-
proach, 35 COLUM. L. RaV. 809 (1935); Cook, Privileges of Labor Unions in the Struggle for Life, 27
YALE L.J. 779 (1918); Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 PoL.
ScI. Q. 470 (1923); Hale, Law Making by Unofficial Minorities, 20 COLUM. L. RaV. (1920).
16 According to Hart, language, including law language, is both immediately settled at some
points and open-textured at others. It has, therefore, a "central core of undisputed meaning" and "a
penumbra of language." See, H. HART, supra note 1, at 12, 123. However, the present authors do
not approximate Hart's sophistication.
17 p. MCCORMICK & I. GREENE, supra note 6, at 59, 78, 228-30.
18 Id. at 78.
19 The authors use "following," adjudicating," and "interpreting" synonymously throughout.
20 P. MCCORMICK & I. GREENE, supra note 6, at 7.
21 Id. See also id. at 228-30.
22 The authors define policy-making as "the process of clarifying ambiguous language in law,"
id. at iv, and equate policy-making as such with "legislating." Id. at 229.
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domesticated and eviscerated version of realism.23 For if, as McCormick
and Greene would have it, judicial practice is only subject to the realist
challenge at the margins, then most judicial practice is, without more,
salvaged from the vagaries of politics. What remains becomes political in
a very antiseptic and peculiarly legal fashion.2 4
Consider first the authors' report on the social histories of judges.2"
Canadian judges, they report, "like all elites, tend to be drawn more from
the established sectors of society."2 6 They are, as a consequence, dispro-
portionately older, married males with "upper-class backgrounds" who
tend to be affiliated with dominant religious, ethnic, racial and political
groups.27 Prior to appointment, these judges were generally "high
achievers," often as partners in larger firms.2" Of course no one would
contest this report, but at issue is its significance, not its validity. The
authors offer an appraisal which, true both to their view of law and to
their version of realism, is at once both politically naive and legally
misconceived.
According to the authors, the social histories of judges are only rele-
vant when judges are policy-making and, even then, only indirectly.29
When the case is difficult because the language of the law is ambiguous,
judges, the authors claim, typically attempt to legislate a meaning by dis-
cerning the view of the "average reasonable person."3 It is this unlikely
view of matters at the margins that informs the authors' entire thesis
7 The term indefensible is used because legal thought has moved so far beyond such an under-
standing. If one wishes to maintain g dichotomy between law and politics--or, as the authors would
have it, between law and policy-mere declaration no longer suffices. Instead, one must come to
terms with the vast amount of recent literature on law as interpretation because that literature estab-
lishes the discourse in terms of which alone the dichotomy could possibly be maintained.
For a sampling of interpretive literature in addition to the founding symposia, Law and Litera-
ture: Symposium, 60 TEx. L. REv. 373 (1982). Symposium on Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 1
(1985). There is a long running debate between Owen Fiss and Stanley Fish, on the one hand, and
Ronald Dworkin and Stanely Fish on the other. See Fiss, Conventionalism, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 177
(1985); Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REv. 739 (1982); Law as Interpretation,
supra note 13. See also Dworkin, Please Don't Talk about Objectivity Any More, in THE POLrrics OF
INTERPRETATION 287 (W. Mitchell ed. 1983); Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1325 (1984);
Fish, Still Wrong After All These Years, 6 L. & PHIL. 401 (1987); Fish, Working on The Chain Gang:
Interpretation in the Law and in Literary Criticism in THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION 271 (W.
Mitchell ed. 1983); Fish, Wrong Again, 62 TEx. L. REv. 299 (1983).
24 P. MCCORMICK & GREENE, supra note 6, at v.
25 Id. at 59-80. The report is based on three sources: a biographical questionnaire completed
by one-hundred-sixteen Alberta judges (with a sixty-seven percent response rate), an analysis of a
random sample of press releases announcing two hundred seventy seven federal and provincial judi-
cial appointments, and previously existing studies and reports on judicial backgrounds. Id. at 60-61.
26 Id. at 66.
27 Id. at 70.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 78-80.
30 Id. at 79. See also id. at 59.
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with respect to the significance of judges' social histories.31 The thesis is
that, upon comparing "the backgrounds of judges to those of average
Canadians, ' 32 judges are not "in an ideal position to assess the views of
the 'average reasonable person.' 33
Even if it were true that judges sought to interpret law using this
utilitarian calculus, the authors' appraisal of the impact of the judicial
interpreter's social background woefully under-estimates the ideological
significance of class, gender and race.34 Indeed the authors' analysis triv-
ializes this impact. The fact that legal interpreters are disproportionately
class-preferenced white males is a central feature of the judicial enter-
prise. This is cause for concern, not because judges become incapable of
empathizing with the demographic majority but, much more critically,
because their vision of the right, good and, more particularly, their view
of what the world-in-law (including the worlds of others that appear
before them) ought to be, may become infected. Class, race, and gender
are not issues of legal interpretation but of ideological position. The
challenge is to determine whether law consolidates and expresses such a
position or whether, as Dworkin and others suggest, constraint and rule
by law is still possible.35
Matters do not improve when the authors report on how judges con-
ceive of their role and practice.36 With respect to judicial role, the au-
thors make two inquiries of interest-first, why had the judges
interviewed accepted a judicial appointment and second, what qualities
31 This view is unlikely because it is so idiosyncratic. See supra note 22 (Discussing contempo-
rary interpretation theory). See also infra, note 31 (listing traditional texts on legal interpretation).
32 P. MCCORMICK & I. GREENE, supra note 6, at 61.
33 Id. at 60.
34 The authors offer neither justification nor sources for this claim. This is not at all surprising
since neither contemporary interpretation theory nor traditional texts on legal interpretation support
such a view. Regarding the former, see sources cited supra note 22 (discussing contemporary inter-
pretation theory). Regarding the latter, see MAXWELL ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES (P.
Largan l1th ed. 1962); G. COCKRAM, THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES (1975); R. CROSS,
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (T. Bell & P. Kurland 2d ed. 1987); R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRE-
TATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES (1975); J. EVANs, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
PROBLEMS OF COMMUNICATION (1988).
35 See e.g. R. DWORKIN, supra note 1. See also Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpreta-
tion, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 279 (1985).
36 Their report on the judicial role is contained in Chapter 5. P. MCCORMICK & I. GREENE,
supra note 6, at 118-66. Their reports on judicial practice are contained in Chapters 6 through 9. Id.
at 167-246 Chapters 4, 5, 8, and 9 are, by far, more interesting. Chapter 4 presents the results of
questions having to do with why lawyers accept judicial appointments and, once judges, how they
view ideal judicial characteristics. Id. at 83-117. Chapter 5 presents the authors' findings of trial
court understanding ofjudicial decision-making, Id. at 118-66. Chapters 8 and 9 present the results
of Alberta judges' assessment of the importance of precedent and of the propriety of judicial legisla-
tion. Id. at 211-46. Chapters 6 and 7 are less interesting because they largely consist of descriptions
of appellate and Supreme Court of Canada procedures. Id. at 167-210.
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did those judges most admire in other judges?37 Their report regarding
the first inquiry reveals an amazing banality in the decisions by lawyers
to accept judicial appointments. The authors report that the judges in-
terviewed accepted appointments for either practical or idealistic rea-
sons."8 Practical reasons are defined as having to do with "a desire to
escape negative features of the practice of law," including boredom,
burnout, dissatisfaction with the business aspects of private practice, and
pragmatic calculations such as security and independence.39 Idealistic
reasons are reasons which the authors think declare "something intrinsi-
cally attractive about the bench," including views that appointment
presents new challenges within the profession, or that it represents, as
either an honor or a reward, the pinnacle of a legal career.' These rea-
sons are plainly of the self-referencing, careerist variety, and one could
reasonably expect the authors to provide an explanation, especially since
any coherent mention of public service among the responses is absent.
With respect to the matter of qualities admired in other judges, the
authors report that their respondent judges "value the qualities of dili-
gence and industry, of humaneness, of patience and courtesy, of a knowl-
edge of the law and intelligence, of a sense of fair play and
decisiveness."41 These responses are striking in their omission of public
service, and the authors do not provide any analysis in response, prefer-
ring instead to categorize responses in terms of the values they think are
represented.42 However, as discussed below, the authors fail to provide
any explanation for this omission.
Their failure in both these instances has, I think, everything to do
with their failure to take seriously the central, unifying characteristic of
their response group-namely, that their respondents are all legal pro-
fessionals. 43 Had they done so, the authors could have avoided suc-
cumbing to excessive judge admiration and could have framed questions
more likely to have provided a mature explanation of their results.' For
instance, they could then have inquired into whether responses regarding
both appointment and admired qualities are related to socialization
within the profession. Such inquiries probably would have suggested at
37 Id. at 81. The first inquiry was made of both Ontario and Alberta judges. Id. at 84. The
second inquiry was made of Alberta judges only. Id. at 115.
38 Id. at 85.
39 Id.
4 Id.
41 Id. at 115.
42 Id. at 113.
43 The authors do sometimes mention this fact and occasionally draw instruction from it. See
e.g., id. at 117 (where the authors associate the judicial admiration of industry with judges having
been high achievers in private practice). See also id. at 165 (where the authors associate a lack of
collegiality with the judges' independent work experience as practicing lawyers).
44 See e.g., id. at 117, 188, 208, 258.
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least three things: that the admired qualities are very much a transfer to
the judicial realm of the qualities of industriousness and gentlemanly
conduct which are valued in private practice; that public service re-
sponses with respect to appointment were absent because such motiva-
tions are largely absent in private practice;4" and that the two categories
of responses are, in consequence, related, and only intelligible, in terms of
the profession's ideology, especially its deep and enduring belief in indi-
vidual initiative and meritocratic hierarchy. By ignoring the importance
of professionalism, the authors missed the opportunity to do any of this,
because they thereby forbade themselves the means of articulating the
inquiry.
The authors deliver their report on judicial practice in three major
parts: one describes trial court understanding of its decision-making pro-
cess, a second describes judicial understanding of precedent, and a third
describes judicial responses to the propriety of judicial legislation.' In
each instance, the authors fail to adequately analyze the data and here as
elsewhere, this arises from a lack of consideration for the respondents'
legal professionalism.
Take first their report on trial judges, namely, that trial judges differ
in terms of the amount of discretion they see themselves as having: from
virtually no discretion47 to total discretion.4" The authors interpret this
information as confirmation of their version of realism.49 Whether or not
this is true surely depends on an analysis of why judges interpreted the
authors' open-ended question: "is there a general process by which you
reach a decision on a particular case?" 50 as an inquiry about discretion, if
only because what judges say they are doing may not correspond with
what they are actually doing. This analytic inquiry, as to why legal pro-
fessionals, including judges, think the nature of their practice somehow
turns on the degree of discretion practiced, would unavoidably have led
the authors to conclude that law is, at some very fundamental level, dis-
tinct from politics because, unlike politics, law is not a matter of discre-
tion. Unfortunately, the authors did not pursue such an inquiry,
notwithstanding their conclusion that "most judges are extremely un-
comfortable with the notion of judicial power" appears to demand it.5"
45 See e.g., McKay, The Rise of the Justice Industry and the Decline of Legal Ethics, 68 WASH.
U. L. Q. 829 (1990).
46 The authors also report on appeals courts and on the Supreme Court of Canada but, for the
most, these reports merely describe court process. See P. MCCORMICK & I. GREENE, supra note 6,
at 167-210. Each of the three major inquiries were made only of Alberta judges.
47 The authors designate these responses as strict formalist. See id. at 123.
48 The authors designate these responses as intuitivist. Id
49 Law, it turns out, is not a decision-making process as it allows for "little discretion on the
part of judges." Id at 138.
50 Id. at 121.
51 Id. at 119.
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Their treatment of judicial responses to the questions regarding the
value of precedent and the propriety of judicial legislation is no more
successful. With respect to the former, the authors report that a solid
majority of the judges think that precedent is "an important and valuable
part of judicial decision-making."52 They further state that most judges
seek to follow precedent and will consciously depart from precedent only
on the most narrowly technical and careful grounds. With respect to the
propriety of judicial legislation, they report that the vast majority of
judges think either that they have no law-making role or that their law-
making role is rare and occasional.53 Once again, the issue is not the
accuracy of these reports, but their significance. That question ulti-
mately turns on why judges would disclaim discretion in their decision-
making; upon why they think discretion, whether or not they actually
have it, is so important. Unfortunately, instead of inquiring into what
about legal professionalism could possibly lead judges to conceive of their
practice in such an unempowering fashion, the authors conclude that
their findings about precedent raise the need for further empirical re-
search and that their findings about discretion confirm their notion of
realism.54
In conclusion, Judges and Judging is fundamentally flawed. It takes
an empirical verification of unsurprising truths about judicial back-
grounds and judicial self-conception as demonstrative of a misconceived
realism, instead of as a reason for further inquiry as to why judges would
share such social history and belief in the first place. The book thereby
avoids the much more sophisticated and critical task of associating judi-
cial history and belief with professional socialization, as a process of ide-
ological confirmation and formation. This failure is not without cost.55
The law's professional ideology, particularly its belief that practice is an
expertise-excluding power, has a sharp political point. It insulates judi-
cial actors from political criticism and, at the same time, absolves them
from moral and political responsibility for the social production of judi-
cial work. The failure cannot be excused. No less than legal scholarship,
scholarship in the field of political science is always predicated on theory.
The scholar's choice is to have this by design or by default.
52 Id. at 214.
53 Id.
54 Id at 223-27.
55 The cost, incidentally, is aggravated by the authors' declaration that they are disclosing law
from the inside and, thereby, revealing what it is really like.
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